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Abstract: High profile cases of exploitative labour practices have increased concerns over
agricultural working conditions. However, it is unclear to what extent the public is willing
to trade-off fair working conditions for higher prices. We implement a large-scale survey to
uncover consumer preferences for a food labeling system that certifies fair working conditions
for the workers employed in agricultural production. We test for several methodological issues
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with respect to value elicitation and predictions of reference dependent theory. With our
most conservative estimates, we find that consumers are willing to pay an average premium
of 53 cents per 500 gr, 95% CI [43.9, 62.3], for strawberries with fair labour certification.
Keywords: fair labour label; willingness to pay; equivalent loss; contingent valuation;
inferred valuation; consequentiality; cheap talk; uncertainty scale.
JEL Classification Numbers: C83; C93; D12; Q13.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been a surge of labour exploitation incidents in the Greek agricultural
farm sector. The most recent incident in April 2013 involved 33 Bangladeshi workers being
shot and injured by their supervisors at a strawberry farm as they protested being unpaid
for several months. This incident brought mass media attention in the country about the
long-term issue of labour exploitation in the agricultural farming sector. Subsequently, a
steady stream of cases of mistreatment and unfair working conditions in farm businesses
have emerged, resulting in public outcry in Greece and the European Union. Public anger
was manifested by a strong (albeit temporary) decline in the demand for strawberries.1
Despite the public backlash, farmers have argued that in order to produce at prices that
consumers are willing to pay, and to be competitive with imported agricultural products,
they cannot provide employee benefits (e.g., minimum wage, maximum working hours, sick
leave, housing). Hence, without resorting to illegal employment practices, producers fear
that they will be unable to profitably operate.
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate regarding the controversy about the trade-
offs between fair working conditions and the competitiveness of local agricultural products.
We use non-market valuation techniques designed to uncover the underlying preferences of
Greek consumers towards a food labeling system that certifies ‘fair’ working conditions for the
workers employed at all stages of agricultural production. Our aim is to understand whether
consumers’ alleged disapproval of unfair working practices is reflected in their willingness-
to-pay (WTP) a premium above regular prices of conventional agricultural products. Most
relevant to our work is a labeling system that is already in place in the global agro-food
system known as Fair Trade (FT) labels.2 However, fair labour labeling is distinct from fair
trade labeling in that the latter is mainly focused on commodities or products which are
typically exported from developing countries to developed countries and thus, is focused on
helping producers in developing countries.
Although previous research has studied ethically-related food marketing claims related to
animal welfare, environment, or fair trade, we are not aware of prior research that has focused
specifically on consumer preferences for agricultural employee pay and working conditions.
However, recent works by Howard and Allen (2006, 2010) and Hustvedt and Bernard (2010)
1Although the decline in demand is an indication that part of the society does not tolerate the mistreat-
ment and unfair working conditions of the workers, demand recovered when the dust settled down and the
media coverage stopped. This does not mean that consumers do not care about fair working conditions. It
likely reflects the fact that when something is not in their focus of attention, they tend to ignore or forget it.
This is analogous to many consumers finding an animal slaughtering video repelling, which could perhaps
make some of them temporarily stop eating meat, but which would doubtfully turn them into vegetarians.
2For a recent critical overview of the economic theory behind Fair Trade, see Dragusanu et al. (2014).
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provide accumulated evidence of the demand for labour-related information on a variety of
products. Using both hypothetical and non-hypothetical methods, the studies found that
consumers are willing to pay a premium for products, the production of which mandates
subsistence wages to all employees in the production chain. Our aim in this paper is to take
this line of research a step forward by introducing and testing labels that ensure not only
subsistence wages but also the governance of working hours, access to decent housing, and the
availability of personal hygiene facilities and health care services. Given that employment
in Greek farms is mostly seasonal and reliant on illegal immigrants who might have less
recourse through traditional legal channels, these additional conditions are likely aspects of
an agro-food labour market that consumers might find desirable.3
Although there are legal means by which the state could sanction farmers and businesses
that do not comply with the law with respect to the legal status of their workers or the
legal benefits of the labourers etc., these laws are rarely enforced. For example, a law that
prohibits farmers from hiring immigrants who are not green card holders is already in place
in Greece. However, the law is widely not implemented. From the farmers perspective,
there are good reasons for the non-implementation because of the high risk of encountering
a shortage of farm labourers if they abide by these laws. 4
3There are no official statistics to back our claim that the agricultural sector heavily relies on illegal
immigrants because statistical services do not collect green card status information as this is considered
sensitive personal information. Even if the collection of this information was possible, it would likely be
unreliable given that it is questionable how many of the illegal immigrants would not try to escape census
registration.
However, the illegal immigrant status of many labourers in the agricultural sector is implied by at least two
facts. For one, Southern Europe’s model of migration is very different from the Northern European model
of migration and is characterized (among others) by its broad ‘illegality’ connected to the migration controls
imposed by EU countries, heterogeneity of the nationalities of the immigrants, and male predominance
(Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2005). Illegal migratory flows for Greece in particular, have been facilitated by
the geographic location of Greece, characterized by extended coastlines and relatively easier crossed borders,
which act as the eastern gate to the EU (Kasimis, 2008). Moreover, the nature of the Greek economy, which
is based on tourism, allows the legal entry of migrants who could then stay illegally upon the expiration of
their visas (Kasimis, 2008).
Second, it is the structure of the farm labour market that attracts illegal low-skilled immigrants. Officially,
migrants’ share in the total population was 7.57% in 2015 (Eurostat, 2016) but the actual share is often
estimated to be larger than official statistics (e.g., Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2005). Immigrants represent a
higher share of the economically active population (Kasimis et al., 2003) due to their relatively younger age.
The main working nationalities in the agricultural sector are Albanians, Bulgarians, Indians, Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis (Kasimis and Papadopoulos, 2013). The presence of immigrants in the country skyrocketed
after the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern European countries, which resulted in
hundreds of thousands of (predominantly) Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians flowing into the country
(Kasimis et al., 2003). For the immigrants, the agricultural sector has been very attractive because they can
adjust easily to farm work, which often serves as a first step in their pursuit for a higher standard of living.
The continuous inflow of immigrants reflects a labour market model where ‘old’ immigrants are replaced by
‘newcomers’ (Kasimis, 2008). Thus, collective action and bargaining are limited by the nature of this labour
market.
4After the outbreak of the strawberry farm incidents, the media reported stories that although farmers
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The illegal part of the equation is easier to resolve. For example, with a recently passed
bill, farms in Greece will have the right to legally hire labourers without a green card for
temporary farm work as long as farmers have registered the workers.5 However, this law
does not enforce the other dimensions of the working environment such as subsistence wages,
working hours, access to decent housing, personal hygiene facilities as well as health care
services, which are additional elements of a fair labour certification system.
To uncover consumers’ preferences for a fair labour label, this study uses traditional
stated preferences methods augmented with recent methodological advances designed to
identify and weed out potential biases. We conducted a large scale questionnaire based
experiment in two cities of Greece, Athens and Ioannina. We collected data from personal
interviews of more than 3,800 subjects. In addition to the empirical objective related to fair
labour labels, we also explore several methodological issues that are relevant to nonmarket
valuation, such as social desirability bias, hypothetical bias, consequentiality of the survey,
and certainty of responses. The next section describes the survey-experiment and the relevant
methodological issues we address.
2 The valuation survey-experiment and methodologi-
cal issues
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) has become one of the most popular methods
to measure WTP values for public and private goods, services, or amenities. Although it
was principally developed in environmental and transport economics, it has made consider-
able headway in the valuation of food products over the last decades (e.g., Buzby et al.,
1998; Corsi, 2007). Most, if not all, CVM studies are conducted in hypothetical contexts,
particularly in environmental valuation studies where a real market with salient payments
is difficult to establish (Carson, 2012; Haab et al., 2013; Kling et al., 2012).
and cooperatives asked for more than 4500 farm labourers through an open call, only a handful of people
actually responded to the advertisements. This situation is not different from what has happened in the US
when the E-verify system was introduced and mandated in some states. For example, Bohn et al. (2015) find
that in Arizona where E-verify was mandated in 2007, contrary to its intent, the law did not appear to have
improved labour market outcomes of legal low-skilled workers who compete with unauthorized immigrants.
For instance, they find evidence of diminished employment and increased unemployment among legal low-
skilled workers. Furthermore, the state of Georgia in the United States has reportedly experienced a shortage
of farm labourers due to the E-verify mandate driving immigrants out of Georgia. This has caused crops
being left unharvested (Mcardle, 2012; Powell, 2012). Zahniser et al. (2012) found through a simulation
analysis that a large reduction in the number of unauthorized workers in all sectors of the U.S. economy (the
consequence of E-verify) would lead to a longrun reduction in output and exports in agriculture as well as
the broader economy.
5This has been made possible by Law 4384/2016, Article 58 (Government Gazette Series A, No 58).
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2.1 The inferred valuation method
The CVM involves creating a hypothetical valuation scenario in which consumers are
asked to state their WTP for the product in question. Empirical findings from several
disciplines suggest that results from the CVM can be susceptible to social desirability bias.
There are now several studies that show that when people are asked to predict other people’s
value, as in the Inferred Valuation method (discussed momentarily), they state a different
value than their own (e.g., Frederick, 2012; Kurt and Inman, 2013; Loewenstein and Adler,
1995; van Boven et al., 2000, 2003). Lusk and Norwood (2009b) used a modification of Levitt
and List’s (2007) additive utility model to illustrate how social desirability may carry over to
non-market valuation and produce inflated bids that misrepresent respondents’ preferences.
Their so called Inferred Valuation (IVM) method, addresses social desirability bias by asking
respondents to state their beliefs about the average consumer’s valuation for a good.
Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b) argued that the IVM generates valuations that are less likely
to suffer from normative or moral response biases (such as social desirability bias), and they
found that responses to the IVM better predicted actual shopping behavior than did those
from a CVM. They also found that the IVM produced less hypothetical bias when social
desirability was present. The authors showed that goods with normative dimensions are
more prone to social desirability bias and thus the IVM is more effective in bridging the gap
between the laboratory and field valuations. In the spirit of Lusk and Norwood (2009a,b),
Pronin (2007) argues that people tend to recognize biases in human judgment except when
biases are their own, which implies that predictions over other peoples’ preferences should
mitigate biases.
2.2 Incentive compatible elicitation formats and consequentiality
Ever since the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Arrow
et al., 1993) criticized the open-ended format as providing ‘erratic and biased’ responses, the
favored elicitation format in the CVM literature has been the dichotomous choice (DC)
format. Although other alternatives that were not considered by the NOAA panel were
later developed, Carson and Groves (2007) offer a typology of elicitation formats that shows
that all formats can be seen as generalizations of the DC format. The DC format has been
favored due to its well known property of incentive compatibility. This is due to the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) which states that for the case of
more than two alternatives (i.e., non-DC formats), no non-dictatorial strategy-proof voting
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procedure exists.6
This is to say that any response format with at least three possible outcomes is subject to
individual manipulation (i.e., it is not incentive compatible). This does not imply, however,
that any binary DC format is incentive compatible but that, by elimination, only a DC format
could be incentive compatible assuming subjects believe that their response is consequential
(meaning there is some probability that the respondent’s answer will actually influence the
provision of the good).7 As we discuss in the next paragraph, the consequentiality of the
survey is a key condition in the assumption of incentive compatibility, and yet it is an issue
that has only lately received much attention.
Much of the early literature has evolved around the presumption that hypothetical bias
prevails in CVM estimates (i.e., that people tend to state a higher WTP in hypothetical
questions as opposed to non-hypothetical questions). As such, a number of approaches have
been proposed to mitigate hypothetical bias. As discussed above, the issue of consequen-
tiality has only been given attention in the last few years. Carson and Groves (2007) argue
that to produce useful information about an agent’s preferences, survey results must be
seen as potentially consequential.8 Under consequentiality, survey respondents are explicitly
told that their responses to preference questions will influence provision of the good under
valuation. As a result of Carson and Groves’s (2007) suggestion, the literature examining
the merits of consequential surveys has been rapidly growing.9 While proponents of the
6The theorem was formalized by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) and noted in passing by
Dummett and Farquharson (1961). See also Svensson and Reffgen (2014).
7While proponents of the DC format take this result about the incentive compatibility of the DC format
as granted for any type of good, Carson et al. (1997) show that the DC format is not incentive compatible
in the case of provision of a new private or quasi-public good. The incentive compatibility of the DC format
can be restored for quasi-public or private goods only if the binary choice is between two different forms of
the good, so that the valuation question represents a change in the good (Carson et al., 2001; Carson and
Groves, 2007).
8More recently, Carson et al. (2014) showed theoretically, that the conditions put forward by Carson and
Groves (2007) for ensuring the incentive compatibility of the discrete choice format, also hold under weaker
assumptions that do not not require agent preferences to conform to expected utility. In addition, Poe and
Vossler (2011) provide a discussion of the theoretical arguments set forth by Carson and Groves (2007) and
accumulated supporting empirical evidence. List and Price (2013) also discuss the role of consequentiality
in aligning hypothetical and real statements of value. Rheinberger and Schla¨pfer (2015) express doubt that
Carson et al.’s (2014) results apply to the binary referendum with randomly assigned bids because, as they
argue, the random bid assignment makes binary referendum CVM surveys incentive incompatible since a
typical respondent is presented with a randomly assigned bid that might be very different from the actual
cost of the project under consideration.
9Most of this strand of the literature find that consequentialism can align hypothetical values to real
valuations. For example, Vossler and Evans (2009) find no elicitation bias in participants that vote in advisory
referenda that regard their votes as consequential. Vossler et al. (2012) find a positive bias on WTP estimates
for tree planting projects but that once the analysis is conditioned on the belief that responses had more than
a ‘weak’ impact on policy, stated and real payment WTP functions were statistically identical. Vossler and
Watson (2013) find negative hypothetical bias among inconsequential survey respondents that were to vote in
a public referendum and that hypothetical bias goes away when they focus only on respondents that perceived
7
DC elicitation format take this result about the incentive compatibility of the DC format
as granted for any type of good, Carson et al. (1997) show that the DC elicitation format
is not incentive compatible in the case of provision of a new private or quasi-public good.
The incentive compatibility of the DC elicitation format can be restored for quasi-public or
private goods only if the binary choice is between two different forms of the good, so that the
valuation question represents a change in the good (Carson et al., 2001; Carson and Groves,
2007).
2.3 Cheap talk
The Cheap Talk method has been used to potentially reduce hypothetical bias by re-
minding participants of the tendency among people to inflate their (hypothetical) valuations
(Kling et al., 2012). However, the evidence of its effectiveness is far from conclusive. In
particular, Cummings and Taylor (1999) proposed a quite lengthy cheap talk script which
they found to be effective at reducing hypothetical bias in experiments using public good
referenda. List (2001) and Lusk (2003) found that Cummings and Taylor’s (1999) cheap
talk script lowered bids for inexperienced (unknowledgeable) consumers while Brown et al.
(2003) and Murphy et al. (2005) concluded it was indeed successful but only for high pay-
ment amounts. Blumenschein et al. (2007) on the other hand, found that cheap talk has no
significant impact while the results of Morrison and Brown (2009) suggest that it can over-
calibrate responses and underestimate the actual WTP. Earlier attempts also failed to match
the hypothetical with the actual WTP. Notably, Cummings et al. (1995) found that short
scripts inflated the hypothetical bias while Loomis et al. (1996) argued that although the
short script reminder reduced the ratio of hypothetical and actual WTP, this effect failed
to reach statistical significance. Our script resembles the ones employed in Champ et al.
(2009), Bulte et al. (2005) and Aadland and Caplan (2003) who successfully mitigated the
bias and those of Brummett et al. (2007) and of Poe et al. (2002) that failed to do so.10 In
their vote as consequential. Similarly, Herriges et al. (2010) explore the role of policy consequentiality (note,
that this is not the same as strong consequentiality unless respondents believe there is an implied payment
obligation) and find that WTP distributions are equal only for subjects that believe that the survey has
some potential for shaping policy decisions. Whitehead et al. (2016) find that participatory sporting event
behavior accurately predicts actual behavior at a middle level of respondent certainty, overpredicts actual
behavior at a lower level of certainty, and underpredicts behavior at a higher level of certainty. Mitani
and Flores (2013) explore consequentiality of stated preference choices by means of a laboratory experiment
and find that the probability of provision of a public good has a positive effect on contributions. On the
other hand, Oehlmann and Meyerhoff (2016) find no effects tied to inclusion/exclusion of a consequentiality
script on elicited valuations. On the empirical modelling forefront, Czajkowski et al. (2015) show how to
appropriately integrate subjective measures of latent beliefs about consequentiality in econometric models
by developing a Hybrid Mixed Logit model.
10The cheap talk scripts of Aadland and Caplan (2003) and Poe et al. (2002) were significantly shorter
than ours and the rest.
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addition, our cheap talk script was not designed neutral (as in Aadland and Caplan (2006)
and Silva et al. (2011)) since we side with those who believe that the danger of hypothetical
bias stems from inflated rather than deflated bids.
2.4 Reference dependent preferences
An additional challenge we face with this survey-experiment is the issue of reference-
dependent preferences. In the presence of information asymmetry, reference points may
be formulated differently for each consumer and thus, heterogeneity in valuations may not
only reflect taste heterogeneity. In our context, for example, for the share of consumers
aware of labour exploitation in farms, the current endowment corresponds to products whose
production line entails undesirable practices. As such, the availability of certified alternatives
is seen as an opportunity to upgrade the (extrinsic) quality of goods they consume, at a cost
equal to the price premium of such alternatives. Clearly, this premium is better framed
as their willingness-to-pay (WTP), which is defined as the maximum amount a consumer
would be willing to pay in return for an increase (or upgrade) in his consumption for a
good. This is the valuation measure used in most studies eliciting homegrown values (e.g.,
Bateman et al., 2000). On the other hand, there are uninformed consumers who think
that currently available goods are produced using fair labour practices and thus, according
to their (wrong) perception, the introduction of a certification system would induce an
extra-cost for goods which are the same with the ones they are already consuming. As a
result, their valuation is better framed as an ‘Equivalent loss’ (EL), defined as the maximum
amount a consumer would be willing to pay in place of a reduction (or downgrade) in her
consumption of a good.11 Under Hicksian preferences, these two valuation measures should
be equal to each other (EL=WTP), since ordering of consumption bundles is independent of
individual’s endowment. However, if preferences are formed as in Tversky and Kahneman’s
(1992) reference-dependent theory, this distinction is important. For this reason and to
better approximate the average welfare of fair labour labels, we use both WTP and EL
questions on a between-subjects basis.
The next section describes the experimental design we adopt to test the hypotheses
described above.
11While at a first glance one might think of EL as a willingness to accept measure (WTA), we would like
to emphasize that EL and WTP are both ‘willingness to pay’ measures. The only difference is the starting
point by which one is asked to pay. WTP is paying for an upgrade while EL is paying to avoid downgrading.
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3 Experimental design and questionnaire development
To elicit valuations for the fair labour certification system, we chose a pack of 500gr
of strawberries as our product of interest. This was our chosen product for a number of
reasons. First, we needed a product which is widely consumed and would appeal to most
consumers. Second, we wanted a product that can be sold in packages that could carry
a labeling certification system; strawberries can and are often sold in a packaged form.
Third, the production process of strawberries is a (manual) labour intensive process (labour
contributes to 45-50% of total cost of strawberries (Poinssot, 2013)).
All subjects were first informed about the fair labour certification system. Because there
was the chance that subjects were familiar with a ‘fair trade’ label which could confound
their perception of a ‘fair labour’ label, we wanted to make sure that all subjects would be
actually valuing a ‘fair labour’ label by providing them a script with relevant information
about fair labour labeling (the script can be found in Appendix A.1).
To answer the methodological issues we raised in the previous section, we adopted a de-
sign with elements of a within- as well as a between-subjects design (Charness et al., 2012).
For the between-subjects design, we adopted a 4 × 2 design where we vary the scripts ac-
companying the valuation questions (control (no scripts) vs. cheap talk vs. consequentiality
vs. cheap talk & consequentiality) as well as the elicited valuation measure (equivalent loss
vs. willingness to pay). The five bid amounts used for the Discrete Choice format (20 cents
vs. 40 cents vs. 70 cents vs. 100 cents vs. 120 cents) were selected based on projected
historical prices of strawberries as well as feedback we received from the pilot survey (see
Appendix A.3 for a discussion of selection of bid amounts). The bid amounts were varied on
a between subject basis so that each subject was asked for his/her valuation at only one bid
amount. Table 1 shows our experimental design and the per treatment number of subjects.
Valuations were elicited using the CVM as well as the IVM on a within subjects basis. The
order was counterbalanced.
The cheap talk script was compiled from several sources as well as our own previous work
(e.g., Bulte et al., 2005; Lusk, 2003) and reads as follows:
“In a minute you’ll be asked whether you are willing to pay a certain amount
for strawberries.
This question will be hypothetical, that is, you will not actually have to pay.
In general, people experience difficulties in answering hypothetical questions.
They often state they are willing to pay an amount larger than the amount they
are willing to pay in reality.
One reason why this happens is because when the time comes to actually
10
Table 1: Experimental design
Equivalent Loss Willingness to pay
Bid amount 20 40 70 100 120 20 40 70 100 120 Total
IVM
then
CVM
Control 46 47 47 47 47 51 50 49 49 48 481
Consequentiality 44 47 47 47 47 48 47 48 48 48 471
Cheap talk 47 47 47 47 47 48 47 47 47 48 472
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
47 47 47 47 47 49 48 48 48 48 476
CVM
then
IVM
Control 48 48 48 49 46 50 49 49 49 49 485
Consequentiality 46 47 47 46 48 50 49 49 50 49 481
Cheap talk 46 47 47 47 47 49 49 49 49 49 479
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
47 47 47 48 48 49 48 48 49 49 480
Total 371 377 377 378 377 394 387 387 389 388 3825
Notes: CVM stands for Contingent valuation; IVM stands for Inferred Valuation.
make the payment, they also consider that this money won’t be available for
other purchases. Therefore, when the question is hypothetical, it is easier to
exaggerate their response.
Before answering the willingness to pay question, try to think whether you
are really willing to pay this amount for strawberries and that this amount will
no longer be available for other purchases.”
The consequentiality script was adopted from Vossler and Watson (2013) and Vossler
and Evans (2009) and reads as follows:
“We would like to inform you that the survey results will become available to
producers, traders and retailers of agricultural products as well as to the wider
general public of consumers. This means that this survey could affect the decision
of producers, traders and retailers to adopt a Fair labour certification system for
strawberries as well as the average price of strawberries.”
After the script(s) was(were) read, the valuation questions followed. In the control (no
script) treatment, the valuation treatments followed right after information about the fair
labour label was given. The willingness to pay valuation measure was framed as:
“Assume you are given a pack of half a kilo of conventional strawberries
without any certification [show picture 2]. Would you be willing to pay XX cents
so that you can exchange it with a similar pack of strawberries certified with a
fair labour label [show picture 3]?”12
12The pictures can be found in Appendix A.2.
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Conversely, the equivalent loss measure was framed as:
“Assume you are given a pack of half a kilo of strawberries certified with a
fair labour label [show picture 3]. Would you be willing to pay XX cents so that
you can avoid exchanging it with a pack of conventional strawberries without
any certification? [show picture 2]”
Following the literature on certainty scales (Champ et al., 1997; Morrison and Brown,
2009), every CVM discrete choice question was followed by a question asking respondents
to state how certain they were about their response on a 10-point scale anchored with the
labels “Not certain at all” and “Very certain” .
Similar to the CVM questions, the IVM questions were formatted to elicit the willingness
to pay measure:
“Assume that an average consumer is given a pack of half a kilo of conventional
strawberries without any certification [show picture 2]. Do you think s/he would
be willing to pay XX cents so that s/he can exchange it with a similar pack of
strawberries certified with a fair labour label [show picture 3]?”
or the equivalent loss valuation measure:13
“Assume that an average consumer is given a pack of half a kilo of strawberries
certified with a fair labour label [show picture 3]. Do you think s/he would be
willing to pay XX cents so that s/he can avoid exchanging it with a pack of
conventional strawberries without any certification? [show picture 2]”
A consequentiality question was also included to allow us to test for differences in re-
sponses between respondents with different consequentiality perceptions of the survey. The
13 One of the reviewers pointed that the equivalent loss valuation measure, where subjects are asked
their willingness to pay for avoiding an exchange, places subjects in a very artificial situation. Although the
situation presented to subjects is not aligned to their everyday shopping, we argue that this is a credible
exchange situation. To reiterate the example given before, consider a person that thinks that food products
are produced following what the law mandates; i.e., only green card holders work in farms, they are paid
the minimum wage and extra compensation for working overtime, they have decent housing conditions etc.
For these consumers, the introduction of a fair labour certification system would induce an extra-cost for
goods which are the same with the ones they are already consuming. As a result, the new product offer is
seen as a loss; a downgrade in their consumption of a good; i.e., paying more for a certified product that
is not seen as a higher quality product. Our script tries to mimic this situation. The particular wording
was constructed with the intention to be as close as possible to the wording of the WTP question so that
there are no other nuisance factors in the effect we are trying to isolate. Furthermore, placing consumers
in situations unfamiliar to them is sometimes necessary for studying economic phenomena. Think about
any experimental study of risk preferences, for example, where researchers typically ask subjects to choose
between well defined lotteries with specific probabilities and monetary outcomes. Consumers are not really
familiar with choosing between lotteries in their everyday life. Yet, not many economists would argue that
studies of lottery choice are not useful for studying risk preferences.
12
question was adopted from Vossler and Watson (2013) and Vossler et al. (2012). Participants
had to indicate the indirect consequences of the survey on a five point likert scale anchored
by “not at all” and “very much”. The question was framed as:
“To what extent do you believe that your answers in this survey will be taken
into account by producers, traders and retailers?”
The questionnaire also elicited respondents’ beliefs about the likelihood of hypothetical
bias and social desirability bias (using the social desirability scale (SDS) of Sto¨ber (2001)).
Recently, research in the area of non-market valuation has identified political affiliation and
means of provision of the good; i.e., privately or collectively, as a determinant of willing-
ness to pay for public goods (e.g., Dupont and Bateman, 2012). This mainly originates
from a body of research that has found significant differences in the degree of concern for
environmental goods expressed by individuals with different political affiliations. While our
valuation exercise does not concern a public good, aspects of the fair labour label may ap-
peal to political ideology; e.g., the minimum wage provision. Therefore, a political ideology
question was included, which we adopted from the European Social Survey. A set of demo-
graphic questions on age, gender, education, household size and perceived income position
of the household was also asked as well as questions related to respondents’ price sensitivity
with respect to grocery shopping and purchase frequency of strawberries.
4 Data collection methods
A pilot questionnaire was pre-tested in February-March 2014 in the city of Athens with
160 subjects, after which several adjustments were made. The full scale survey was then
launched on April 1, 2014 and questionnaires were filled in until June 11, 2014. The period
of data collection was predominantly dictated by the fact that strawberries are mainly traded
during April, May and early June. Consumers were randomly intercepted in front of the
main entrance of various supermarkets. In all, 11,510 subjects were intercepted in the cities
of Athens and Ioannina and 3,825 agreed to take part in the survey resulting in a cooperation
rate of 33.23%. Of course, several subjects walked out during an interview or opted not to
respond to certain questions, which further reduced the available number of subjects for
statistical analysis.
Regarding the demographic profile of our sample, Table 2 shows that the vast majority
of respondents were females (66.36%). This is not as problematic as it may seem given
that the primary shoppers in Greece, as in many other countries, are typically females.
For example, one study estimates that 75% of principal household shoppers in the US are
13
females (Mediamark Research and Intelligence, 2009). Therefore, the gender composition
of our sample is not representative of the population of the two cities but it might better
represent the grocery shopping population. Since we also asked respondents to report on the
age and gender composition of their household, we can also compare the demographic profile
of respondents’ households with that of the 2001 census (which is the latest available census
for which basic demographic information are available). The comparison (see Table 2) shows
that discrepancies with the 2001 census are small.
Table 2: Comparison of gender and age groups between survey respondents, their household
members and the 2001 census (percentages)
Males 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 ≥70
Respondents 33.64 0.00 3.47 24.07 22.37 23.50 17.29 7.13 2.18
Households 48.24 8.22 11.89 20.77 15.39 16.61 16.96 7.05 3.03
Census 48.45 9.22 11.46 16.37 16.06 14.54 11.93 10.45 9.96
5 Data analysis and results
As in every experiment, it is critical to explore whether randomization to treatment
was successful by testing if the observable characteristics are balanced across the between
subjects treatments. Table 3 shows the basic descriptive statistics for a set of observable
characteristics. With respect to demographic variables, there is no significant difference
between treatments for gender (Pearson’s χ2 = 5.132, p-value=0.644), education (Pear-
son’s χ2 = 20.168, p-value=0.979), income (Pearson’s χ2 = 39.326, p-value=0.076), age
(Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 5.599, p-value=0.587) and household size (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 3.341,
p-value=0.852).
We also find no difference between treatments with respect to the Social Desirability score
(Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 6.128, p-value=0.525), political ideology (Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 8.036,
p-value=0.329), purchase frequency of strawberries (Pearson’s χ2 = 30.800, p-value=0.671),
price sensitivity in purchasing decisions (Pearson’s χ2 = 22.302, p-value=0.767), perceived
likelihood of hypothetical bias for the respondent (Pearson’s χ2 = 31.952, p-value=0.276)
and perceived likelihood of hypothetical bias for other respondents (Pearson’s χ2 = 23.605,
p-value=0.702). Thus, we can safely conclude that the randomization to treatment on a
wide set of observable characteristics was successful.
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Table 3: Descriptives statistics of subjects’ observable characteristics
Variable name and description Variable levels N Mean S.D.
Gender: Male dummy 3763 0.34 0.47
Age 3721 39.97 13.77
Hsize: Household size 3708 3.40 1.25
Shopper: Dummy for major grocery
shopper
3754 0.78 0.41
SDS: Social Desirability Scale 3636 11.35 2.68
Political: Political ideology scale 3312 4.66 2.14
Educ: Education level
Up to primary school
3708
3.61%
Up to Junior Hi-school 4.75%
Up to Senior Hi-school 22.92%
Some college or university stu-
dent
21.90%
University graduate 37.30%
Post-graduate studies 9.52%
Income: Household’s economic
position
Bad or Very bad
3702
5.73%
Below average 11.16%
Average 47.41%
Above average 19.75%
Good or Very good 15.96%
HBiasOwn: Perceived likelihood of
hypothetical bias for the
respondent
Not likely at all
3725
40.70%
Unlikely 31.03%
Neither likely, nor unlikely 15.09%
Likely 11.49%
Very likely 1.69%
HBiasOther: Perceived likelihood of
hypothetical bias for other
respondents
Not likely at all
3709
4.26%
Unlikely 20.22%
Neither likely, nor unlikely 32.27%
Likely 33.67%
Very likely 9.57%
PurchFreq: Purchase frequency
(when strawberries are available)
Never
3707
14.32%
Once a month 25.06%
2-3 times a month 21.12%
Once a week 28.16%
2-3 times a week 9.55%
More than 2-3 times a week 1.78%
PriceSens: Price sensitivity
Not important at all
3695
1.14%
Not important 3.82%
Neither important, nor unim-
portant
15.21%
Important 42.14%
Very important 37.70%
Notes: S.D. stands for standard deviation. For variables with levels, the percentage of each level is
denoted instead of the mean. For each variable the sample was restricted to observations for which
subjects gave responses to both the CVM and IVM.
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5.1 Descriptive data analysis
Before we proceed with the econometric analysis, we can gain interesting insights by
looking at the raw data. Figure 1 graphs the percentage of Yes/No responses elicited with
the CVM in the discrete choice question for each of the four script treatments. Two ob-
servations are noteworthy. First, it appears that in all treatments, the elicited values are
responsive to prices (bid amounts); we observe a decline of ‘Yes’ responses when the bid
amount increases. The 40 cents bid yields statistically significantly lower proportion of ‘Yes’
responses as compared to the 20 cent bid (p-value<0.001); the 70 cent bid yields significantly
lower responses than the 40 cent bid (p-value=0.001); the 100 cent bid is also lower and sta-
tistically different than the 70 cent bid (p-value=0.015) while the 120 cent bid does not differ
with respect to the 100 cent bid (p-value=0.829). In addition, a significant percentage of
subjects states a high value for the fair labour certification label even when the bid is up to
120 cents. This is interesting since the amount of 120 cents represents a 171% increase in
the price of strawberries (with respect to a price of 70 cents/500 gr). Appendix A.5 also lists
probit estimates in Table A2 with price amounts as the independent variables (70 cents is
the base level), which shows significant price sensitivity for the CVM format. For the IVM
format price sensititivity halts after the amount of 70 cents which means that although the
IVM may be mitigating one kind of bias, data could still suffer from other kinds of biases
(Morkbak et al., 2010).
Second, it appears that the different scripts are not effective in changing response patterns
with respect to the control (no script) treatment. This is confirmed by proportion tests where
we find that the proportion of ‘Yes’ responses in the Control treatment is not significantly
different from the Consequentiality script treatment (p-value=0.225); or the Cheap talk
script treatment (p-value=0.720); or the Cheap talk & Consequentiality script treatment
(p-value=0.082). We reconfirm these findings in the conditional analysis below and so to
save space we’ll confine attention to these results in Appendix A.4.
Figure 2 graphs the proportion of responses in the discrete choice question for the IVM.
The findings are similar to those in the CVM: we find no effect of the scripts on responses
(p-value=0.285, 0.413 and 0.866 when we compare the Control treatment with the Cheap
talk script, Consequentiality script and Cheap talk & Consequentiality script treatments,
respectively). In addition, while proportion of ‘Yes’ responses declines for the first two bid
amounts, it is flat after 70 cents. Proportion tests indicate that the 40 cents bid amount
yields a significantly lower proportion of ‘Yes’ responses when compared with the 20 cents
bid (p-value<0.001), while the 70 cents bid yields lower ‘Yes’ proportion than the 40 cents
bid (p-value<0.001). However, the 100 cents and 120 cents do not yield different responses
when compared with the 70 cents bid (p-value=0.443 and 0.672, respectively).
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Figure 1: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the CVM per treatment
What is even more interesting is that the IVM seems to work as advertised. Figure 2
shows that for all bid amounts, the IVM yields a significantly lower proportion of ‘Yes’
responses when compared with the CVM shown in Figure 1. Proportion tests show that
differences are highly significant for all bid amounts (p-values<0.001 in all cases). The
difference in the proportion of ‘Yes’ is larger than 30% for all bid amounts. This is an
indication that the IVM may be more valid for predicting market outcomes.
Figures 3 and 4 compare the elicited value measures (Equivalent loss vs. Willingness
to pay) for the CVM and the IVM, respectively. It is obvious that since the proportion
of ‘Yes’ responses is higher for WTP than EL, then it is implied that values elicited under
WTP are larger than values elicited under EL. Proportions tests confirm the insight that the
proportion of ‘Yes’ for WTP is larger than EL under the CVM (p-value=0.017) and under
the IVM (p-value<0.001).
5.2 Econometric analysis
To check whether the results obtained above hold under conditional analysis, we esti-
mated interval regression models with clustered standard errors at the individual level to
account for the fact that each person provided responses under both CVM and IVM.14
14In the interval regression the upper and lower limits are set to the price if the answer is a ‘No’ and
‘Yes’, respectively. This set up of the interval regression model is completely equivalent to a probit model
with price as one of the independent variables (Cameron and James, 1987; Cameron, 1988). We chose to
estimate interval regression models because the estimates from these models are easier to interpret and the
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Figure 2: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the IVM per treatment
Figure 3: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the CVM per value measure
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Figure 4: Percentage of Yes/No responses in the IVM per value measure
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates from several specifications. Model (1) is our basic
specification where only the treatment variables are included in the regression. We confirm
that none of the scripts (Cheap talk, Consequentiality or their combination) has any effect
on elicited valuations.15 We provide a more detailed discussion about the script treatment
effects in Appendix A.4.
On the other hand, the IVM dummy is highly significant indicating that subjects un-
der the IVM are stating lower valuations, which is likely an indication that this method
successfully mitigates social desirability and hypothetical bias. The WTP dummy is also
highly significant indicating that elicited valuations are higher when the valuation question
is framed as a WTP question rather than as an EL question. Our result supports the Tver-
sky and Kahneman’s (1991) ‘no loss in buying’ hypothesis which states that buyers do not
value the money they give up in a transaction as a loss. To understand why, one needs to
consider that if agents are loss averse and the money given for an upgrade is perceived as
a loss, then when the upgrade per se is framed as loss avoidance, WTP cannot be higher
variance of WTP is directly estimated (Hanemann and Kanninen, 2001).
15Since hypothetical and social desirability bias are not entirely distinct, one might reasonably expect
the effect of a treatment to vary by context. As an example, we might expect the consequentiality script
to mitigate hypothetical bias and its effect to be more pronounced in the CVM format than in the IVM
format, since the IVM format mitigates social desirability bias. However, when we test for interaction effects
between the treatment dummies and the IVM dummy, none of the interaction terms crosses conventional
statistical significance levels. In addition, since all scripts were read in the beginning of the questionnaire
and our data revealed a significant order effect, we also interacted the order dummy with the treatment
dummies. However, none of the interaction terms was significant as well.
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than EL.16 Another possible explanation is that the framing of the EL and WTP questions
induced expectations that were opposite to current endowments; that is, subjects in the
WTP treatment expected to upgrade while those in the EL treatment expected to down-
grade. This latter explanation, combined with the model of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) where
expectations, and not the status-quo, act as endowments, would cause WTP to be higher
than EL. Finally, there is evidence of significant order effects indicating that when the IVM
question was asked first, then subjects tended to align their response in the CVM question.
This could be due to the fact that answering the IVM question first and the CVM second,
made subjects think about their own biases.
In an effort to improve the credibility of values elicited with hypothetical methods, cer-
tainty corrections in the form of follow up questions after value elicitation questions have
often been used. The process involves recoding uncertain ‘Yes’ responses as ‘No’ responses.
The practical difficulty that arises, however, is the proper determination of the threshold
value below which responses should be considered as uncertain. In studies for which both
hypothetical and real valuations have been collected, there is a benchmark criterion that can
be used. For example, in Champ et al. (1997) and Blumenschein et al. (2001) any person
with a response of 9 or lower was classified as ‘uncertain’ and their WTP values were recoded
accordingly. The cut-off of 9 was selected because this threshold produced a mean willing-
ness to pay that was equivalent to actual willingness to pay. In Morrison and Brown (2009),
the cut-off was set at 7 because this value aligned hypothetical values with real values. For
similar reasons the threshold was set to 7 in Ethier et al. (2000) and Poe et al. (2002).
Given that in our study we did not elicit real valuations due to the hypothetical nature
of the product, we utilized an idea discussed in Beck et al. (2013) that in order to decide
if one model with a certainty correction is ‘better’ than another model with a different
certainty correction, the researcher could use model fit statistics to arrive at a conclusion.
The assumption behind this idea is that the model that better fits the data, is behaviorally
representative of the decision making process. Therefore, we estimated interval regression
models with thresholds varying from 6 to 9 and then calculated information criteria like
Akaike’s IC and Bayesian IC. Table A4 in Appendix A.5 shows the estimated coefficients
from these models and their respective IC. It is obvious that when compared to the basic
model with no correction, a model with a threshold for certainty at a value of 8 is the best
fitting model.
Given this, we recoded the ‘Yes’ responses in the CVM question using a rating of 8 in
the certainty question as the cut-off. Column (2) in Table 4 shows the results. None of
16This claim is valid only if the money spent in EL do feel as a loss. To our knowledge, this assumption
has not been questioned so far in the relevant literature.
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our conclusions changes. The only difference we observe with the addition of demographics
(estimates are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix A.5) is that for the inconsequential sub-
sample, framing of the valuation question does not matter; i.e., we observe that willingness
to pay equals equivalent loss.
We can then proceed in graphing the aggregate demand curves for strawberries with fair
labour certification. Figures 5a and 5b do exactly that for valuations elicited with CVM and
IVM.17 Given that IVM mitigates social desirability bias and the importance of certainty in
elicited valuations, it would be advisable for producers and retailers to base their marketing
decisions on the IVM curve of Figure 5b. Each point on this curve indicates the percentage
of respondents that would buy half a kilo of strawberries with fair labour certification at the
premium projected on the Y axis. The fact that the IVM curve intersects the X axis indicates
that a percentage of consumers would not buy strawberries with fair labour certification even
when these are offered at no premium at all.
(a) Derived from model (1) in Table A3 (w/o cer-
tainty correction)
(b) Derived from model (4) in Table A3 (w/ cer-
tainty correction)
Figure 5: Aggregate demand curves for the CVM and IVM
17For graphing the aggregate demand curves we used predicted valuations from models (1) (without
certainty correction) and (4) (with certainty correction) shown in Table A3. We use the models with
demographics because these provide more variation in predicted values between subjects and avoids graphing
a step function. We then sort the predicted valuations from lowest positive value to highest positive value.
Note that the predictions are not precluded from being negative which are to be interpreted as cases for
which subjects do not value the good offered as of higher quality. The lowest positive predicted valuation
can be interpreted as a price point which all subjects with positive valuations would be willing to pay. The
highest positive predicted valuation can be interpreted as a price point which none of the subjects would be
willing to pay. A similar exercise can be performed for each individual prediction, achieving a one-to-one
correspondence between predicted WTPs and the percent of subjects willing to pay that particular price
(given a representative sample, this can be thought of as a market share). The points can then be plotted
producing scatter graphs similar to Figures 5a and 5b.
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6 Conclusions and discussion
There have been increasing calls around the world for urgent action to tackle widespread
abuse of migrant workers in the agri-food sector. In addition, the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development, clearly states the promotion of full and productive employment and
decent work for all, as one of its main goals (Goal 8).18 This paper sought to contribute to
the debate regarding the controversy about the trade-offs between fair working conditions
and the competitiveness of local agricultural products. To do so, we used a Contingent Val-
uation survey designed to uncover the underlying preferences of Greek consumers towards
a food labeling system that certifies fair working conditions for the workers employed at all
production stages of agricultural products. In addition to this important empirical objective,
we also examined several methodological issues; i.e, how we can mitigate hypothetical bias,
social desirability bias, and lack of consequentiality. We also examined predictions of refer-
ence dependent theory by testing whether framing the valuation question as an ‘Equivalent
Loss’ (EL) differs from the classical ‘Willingness-to-pay’ elicitation.
Given the widely reported tendency for respondents to overstate their WTP in stated
preferences studies, it seems reasonable to suggest that the IVM was more successful than
using a short cheap talk script in mitigating social desirability bias. However, none of
the scripts we employed (i.e., cheap talk, consequentiality and their combination) had any
effect on elicited valuations. For the consequentiality script, this is surprising given that it
has emerged as an important addition to standard CVM studies (Vossler and Evans, 2009;
Vossler and Watson, 2013). For the cheap talk script, on the other hand, our finding is not
uncommon given the mixed results obtained in the literature. However, we do not wish to
downplay a well established strand of the literature which has identified the effectiveness of
cheap talk scripts in mitigating hypothetical bias (e.g., Lusk, 2003; Morrison and Brown,
2009; O¨zdemir et al., 2009). One way to interpret our null result from the evaluation of
these two scripts is that using scripts from previous studies is not a panacea that will work
in every single study.
One of the reviewers of our paper offers another explanation for the ineffectiveness of the
consequentiality script. S/he advances the argument that in other consequentiality studies
there has been a clearly defined institution responsible for implementing certain manage-
18The Agenda is a universal plan, signed in 2015 by all 193 Member States of the United Nations that
seeks to stimulate action over the next fifteen years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the
planet. Responsible for the design and implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
included in the agenda, is the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) set
up by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2012. More information about the SDSN network can be found
at http://unsdsn.org/ and for the Greek chapter at http://www.unsdsn.gr/. Both were last accessed on
August 11, 2016.
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ment actions of laws. However, in our case there is no single institution that implements
changes because the set of producers, traders and retailers is a very large one. As such, the
consequentiality script might lack credibility and this could explain the ineffectiveness of the
consequentiality script. The reviewer correctly notes that the context of the script we used
is different from, for example, that of Vossler and Evans (2009) in which there was an actual
referendum with binding consequences where they noted to voters that the experimenters
would use their votes ‘. . . as advice on whether or not to pass the referendum’. However, for
the survey to be consequential, it does not have to be that all producers should coordinate in
producing fair labour labelled products or that the law mandates an action (we will discuss
momentarily why the fair labour label should be looked at as a voluntary scheme). We could
plausibly assume that if agents are profit maximizers and they find that they can make more
money by certifying their products as fair labour products, then they would be better off
using a fair labour label. That is, the survey could be seen as consequential if market forces
could drive just a small part of the supply chain to demand a fair labour product due to
consumer demand.
Furthermore, not all studies where there is a clearly defined institution for implementing
changes have been successful in calibrating WTP based on perceived consequentiality. Re-
moundou et al. (2012) examined whether WTP estimates for the design and implementation
of a forest restoration project were sensitive to the supervising authority (National govern-
ment vs. European Commission) and found no effect despite the significant differences in the
trust levels reported for the two institutions. Oehlmann and Meyerhoff (2016) elicit WTP
regarding landscape externalities from renewable energy development in Germany using a
discrete choice experiment. They implement a 2 × 2 experimental design where they vary
the institution responsible for the implementation (State vs. Federal) and the provision of
information about whether the results will be provided to decision makers. They do not
find any significant differences between treatments in terms of the WTP estimates nor when
they test for differences among those respondents who perceive their choices as consequen-
tial. Oehlmann and Meyerhoff (2016) note that although it is critical that respondents are
convinced that their responses are consequential, this is not always under the control of the
researcher since it could also be influenced by the social and political debate on the topic
explored. They conclude that a consequentiality device is not a general tool to calibrate
stated WTP since it can depend on certain conditions. Oehlmann and Meyerhoff (2016)
note a point made in Vossler et al. (2012) that requirements for consequential choice may
not be present when stated preference studies are conducted on a hotly debated topic where
participants have entrenched political views. In this case, beliefs about the strategic value
of non-truthful voting may be much stronger and could introduce bias in the measurement
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of preferences. We agree with Oehlmann and Meyerhoff (2016) that more research is needed
to further test the conditions of the effectiveness of consequentiality scripts in reducing hy-
pothetical bias in different contexts.
Our results also show that values elicited under WTP are larger than values elicited
under EL, which supports Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) ‘no loss in buying’ hypothesis;
i.e., that buyers do not consider the money they give up in a transaction as a loss or Ko˝szegi
and Rabin’s (2006) as a model of expectation-based preferences, especially if our framing
has reversed the perception of the status-quo. When social desirability is taken out of
our estimates and we correct for uncertainty, we find that consumers are willing to pay an
average premium of 53 cents per 500 gr, 95% CI [43.9, 62.3], of strawberries with fair labour
certification19, which is equivalent to 72.6% of the average realized mode price for April-May
2014 (which was at e1.46/Kg). This can be valuable information for producers and retailers
that seek to differentiate their products and who are wondering whether costs associated
with product differentiation can be recouped from potential customers.
The fair labour label should not be looked at as a scheme that would force all farmers
to offer better working conditions and hire only green card holders. We believe that a
mandatory scheme would not be viable given that a law mandating the hiring of only green
card holders could not always be enforced. In addition, enforcement of a labelling scheme
could have all the unintended consequences that states like Georgia in the United States
experienced after the mandatory introduction of E-verify. This drove illegal immigrants out
of the state with devastating consequences for farmers. A voluntary scheme, on the other
hand, would create the right incentives for some producers to differentiate their products, sell
these at a higher premium, and avoid a market where only ‘lemons’ are sold (Akerlof, 1970).
In addition, consumers are benefited if both types of products exist in the market since some
consumers may not afford the price premiums that fair labour products would demand in
order to be available in the market. This is for the same reason that not all consumers can
afford fair trade products. For this segment of the market, a mandatory labelling scheme
would likely create undesirable substitutions between local (subject to mandatory labelling)
and imported (not subject to mandatory labelling) food products.
All in all, our study provides the first economic estimates in the literature of premiums
associated with fair labour certification and shows that while fair labour certification is a road
not yet taken, it might carry significant benefits for crop labourers, producers and consumers.
The positive premiums that our respondents are willing to pay, suggest that people are aware
of fair labour issues and value the better treatment of workers in the agricultural sector.
19This corresponds to the average predicted positive inferred valuation from model (4) shown in Table A3.
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A Appendix
A.1 Questionnaire scripts
Information for the fair labor informational script was compiled from three relevant to
the fair labor label websites: an auditing non-profit organization that formally measures and
accredits best employment practices (http://www.fairworkingconditions.ie), the fair
labor association (http://www.fairlabor.org) and the Food Alliance certification pro-
gramme (http://foodalliance.org). The script read like this:
“The Fair Labor label [show picture 1]20 can be certified by various organi-
zations like the Fair Working Conditions.ie which is a non-profit international
organization that aims in recognizing and improving employment conditions.
Such a label ensures that the product is produced in a business farm that strictly
follows the standards set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). These
standards concern the maximum number of working hours per week, the legal
compensation and labor benefits required by state law for each activity sector
as well as workers’ hygiene conditions in their working place. In addition, the
standards prohibit child labor and bind the employer for no discrimination on
the basis of race, nationality, or any other criteria.”
A.2 Pictures
20The picture can be found in Appendix A.2.
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A.3 Selection of bid amounts
To select the bid amounts for the discrete choice valuation question, we first examined
historical data for strawberries from the Athens Central Market Organization S.A. which is
one of the major markets for vegetable and meat wholesalers in Greece.21 The historical data
show that the bulk of strawberry sales takes place between April and May (smaller quantities
of strawberries are also traded in February, March and June) which also determined the data
collection period of our survey-experiment. A simple linear projection of strawberry prices
with data from April 2008 to May 2013, projected an average mode price for April-May
2014 at e1.458/Kg. This is remarkably close to the realized average mode price for April-
May 2014 at e1.465/Kg. Given that our valuation product was selected to be a pack of
500gr of strawberries (corresponding projected price is e0.73/500 gr) and that the valuation
question concerned an upgrade (or downgrade, depending on the elicited valuation measure),
we decided that our price range would center around e0.70 taking also into account feedback
from a pilot survey. Therefore, the full price range was selected as: 20 cents, 40 cents, 70
cents, 100 cents and 120 cents.
A.4 Cheap talk and consequentiality treatment effects
An explanation about why the consequentiality script does not appear to have a signifi-
cant treatment effect can be provided by regressing the treatment dummies on the five point
Likert consequentiality question by means of an ordered probit model. None, of the treat-
ment dummies has any effect on the perceived consequentiality of the survey which is to be
interpreted that the consequentiality script failed to change subjects’ beliefs about whether
their answers in the survey could potentially affect the decision of producers and retailers to
adopt fair labour practices.
As we have discussed in previous sections, recent literature has argued that consequen-
tiality is needed for incentive compatibility. We therefore explore differences in results for
people who believe and do not believe their answers are consequential. Based on the five
point Likert consequentiality question, we divided subjects into ‘consequential’ and ‘incon-
sequential’. We defined the consequential sample as involving subjects that stated that they
believed their answers will be taken into account by producers, traders and retailers on a
medium or higher likelihood (3 or more on the 5-point Likert scale). The inconsequential
sample was defined as those that perceived that the survey would have little or no effect to
producers, traders and retailers.
Columns (2) and (3) in Table A1 show estimates from the consequential and inconse-
quential subsamples, respectively. The results are roughly similar with those from the full
sample with one exception. A few script treatment variables are now statistically significant
(albeit only at the 10% level). However, this not is not likely a robust result. Table A3
in Appendix A.5 shows estimates of the consequential and inconsequential subsamples with
the addition of demographic and attitudinal variables in the list of independent variables.
As evident, the script treatment variables are no longer statistically significant. Thus, we
21The Athens Central Market Organization S.A. (http://www.okaa.gr/) is a public organization super-
vised by the Ministry of Rural Development and Food. It serves as an organized host of about 600 vegetable
and meat wholesalers and operates in an area of about 26 hectares.
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conclude that there are no differential effects with respect to the script treatment variables
between the subsamples.
Regarding the cheap talk script, as mentioned in the methodology section, it is not the
first time that it is found not to affect consumer responses. This may have happened for
various reasons, such as that the bid amounts were very low compared to one’s income and
thus not salient enough (Brown et al., 2003; Murphy et al., 2005) or that we have turned
all consumers into ‘knowledgeable’ or ‘experienced’ due to the extensive information we
have provided beforehand about the fair labour certification system (List, 2001; Lusk, 2003).
Overall, as we do not have access to real market or transaction data, we cannot claim that
cheap talk or consequentiality scripts failed to reduce hypothetical bias but we can conclude
that they did not alter the results.
A.5 Additional tables
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Table A2: Probit estimates
(1) (2)
CVM IVM
20 cents 0.540∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.066)
40 cents 0.235∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.066)
100 cents -0.166∗∗ 0.052
(0.069) (0.067)
120 cents -0.180∗∗∗ 0.023
(0.069) (0.067)
Consequentiality -0.073 -0.060
(0.065) (0.059)
Cheap talk -0.020 0.052
(0.065) (0.059)
Cheap talk & Con-
sequentiality
-0.110∗ 0.010
(0.064) (0.059)
WTP 0.111∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.042)
Order -0.023 -0.368∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.042)
Constant 0.661∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.066)
N 7544 7544
AIC 8018.884 9826.104
BIC 8088.170 9895.389
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p¡0.1, ** p¡0.05, *** p¡0.01
7
Table A3: Interval regression estimates (with demographics)
Without certainty correction With certainty correction
Full sample Consequential Incosequential Full sample Consequential Incosequential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consequentiality -10.004 -5.011 -17.604∗ -1.454 -3.105 -2.717
(8.860) (15.423) (10.702) (9.182) (16.683) (10.534)
Cheap talk 10.541 24.280 -0.598 14.388 25.652 4.918
(8.969) (15.901) (10.878) (9.356) (17.478) (10.565)
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
-3.782 10.789 -14.183 1.119 9.900 -4.332
(8.732) (15.578) (10.588) (9.065) (16.621) (10.441)
IVM -163.861∗∗∗ -205.998∗∗∗ -142.361∗∗∗ -66.158∗∗∗ -75.862∗∗∗ -61.834∗∗∗
(14.479) (31.089) (15.618) (7.856) (15.615) (8.722)
WTP 23.825∗∗∗ 41.896∗∗∗ 11.616 19.588∗∗∗ 31.131∗∗ 11.599
(6.693) (12.883) (7.751) (6.830) (12.954) (7.663)
Order -36.990∗∗∗ -49.069∗∗∗ -34.703∗∗∗ -39.681∗∗∗ -54.481∗∗∗ -35.468∗∗∗
(6.997) (13.214) (8.305) (7.360) (14.701) (8.257)
Age -0.948∗∗∗ -0.955∗ -0.902∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗ -0.507 -0.800∗∗
(0.294) (0.518) (0.350) (0.301) (0.538) (0.350)
Gender -4.828 0.318 -0.649 2.293 8.625 5.143
(7.031) (12.669) (8.217) (7.240) (13.536) (8.152)
Educ2 17.138 18.658 16.325 15.580 8.417 22.482
(24.906) (42.467) (31.642) (24.716) (44.026) (29.231)
Educ3 22.888 45.385 20.961 35.582
∗ 43.566 44.645∗
(20.094) (35.509) (25.000) (20.446) (37.395) (23.914)
Educ4 -2.374 1.097 2.225 1.369 -2.086 11.821
(20.756) (35.807) (25.761) (21.210) (37.974) (24.833)
Educ5 10.546 13.154 18.559 25.120 17.675 40.664
∗
(19.871) (34.460) (24.845) (20.294) (36.547) (23.855)
Educ6 -10.343 -36.998 14.466 0.970 -31.209 29.688
(21.892) (38.326) (26.859) (22.472) (40.724) (25.827)
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Hsize -1.189 -4.211 -0.449 -2.495 -8.946∗ 0.656
(2.642) (4.549) (3.333) (2.738) (5.099) (3.270)
Shopper -1.481 0.915 -4.325 12.480 13.377 11.631
(8.195) (14.532) (9.920) (8.436) (15.628) (9.619)
Political -0.130 3.786 -4.183∗∗ 0.584 2.879 -2.464
(1.485) (2.582) (1.903) (1.532) (2.768) (1.859)
SDS 8.564∗∗∗ 3.314 9.657∗∗∗ 8.959∗∗∗ 3.877 9.721∗∗∗
(1.480) (2.452) (1.790) (1.556) (2.613) (1.785)
HBiasOhter2 41.399
∗∗ 64.628∗∗ 20.406 38.922∗∗ 56.068 23.938
(18.235) (32.145) (22.881) (18.591) (34.350) (21.431)
HBiasOther3 33.055
∗ 58.042∗ 14.626 32.665∗ 46.854 24.046
(17.669) (31.311) (22.280) (18.100) (33.479) (20.989)
HBiasOther4 29.447
∗ 57.144∗ 12.700 29.791 52.691 18.366
(17.713) (31.582) (22.148) (18.156) (34.051) (20.721)
HBiasOther5 9.804 -1.102 18.791 12.639 4.112 23.327
(19.516) (34.341) (24.331) (20.178) (37.729) (22.896)
HBiasOwn2 -5.541 -13.870 2.963 -31.336
∗∗∗ -49.179∗∗∗ -18.610∗∗
(7.758) (13.870) (9.184) (8.512) (16.981) (9.186)
HBiasOwn3 8.750 -14.284 19.246 -30.126
∗∗∗ -64.911∗∗∗ -15.267
(9.863) (16.892) (12.584) (10.565) (20.970) (12.378)
HBiasOwn4 2.014 -10.565 4.007 -32.455
∗∗∗ -49.704∗∗ -30.036∗∗
(11.196) (18.890) (14.243) (11.807) (21.772) (14.347)
HBiasOwn5 17.096 65.579 -1.705 -14.725 20.781 -30.732
(26.693) (54.842) (28.976) (27.914) (54.053) (30.740)
PurchFreq2 66.967
∗∗∗ 58.716∗∗∗ 62.158∗∗∗ 58.963∗∗∗ 50.960∗∗ 52.897∗∗∗
(11.784) (21.651) (13.129) (12.142) (23.056) (12.818)
PurchFreq3 57.546
∗∗∗ 48.908∗∗ 48.179∗∗∗ 59.693∗∗∗ 49.139∗∗ 49.452∗∗∗
(11.773) (21.250) (13.327) (12.512) (23.013) (13.415)
PurchFreq4 66.355
∗∗∗ 66.010∗∗∗ 49.550∗∗∗ 69.068∗∗∗ 67.736∗∗∗ 51.076∗∗∗
(11.825) (21.826) (12.960) (12.491) (23.533) (12.993)
PurchFreq5 88.770
∗∗∗ 91.399∗∗∗ 58.107∗∗∗ 104.134∗∗∗ 109.581∗∗∗ 71.052∗∗∗
(15.408) (26.859) (18.588) (16.406) (29.949) (18.336)
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PurchFreq6 94.388
∗∗∗ 96.559∗∗ 75.980∗ 116.244∗∗∗ 148.404∗∗∗ 63.232∗
(28.220) (44.987) (39.386) (28.428) (50.073) (35.285)
PriceSens2 8.923 21.046 -9.842 13.128 -4.823 -0.201
(32.211) (71.787) (33.943) (32.009) (76.334) (30.419)
PriceSens3 3.648 0.217 -6.608 6.602 -36.810 6.492
(28.887) (67.031) (29.036) (28.952) (71.693) (26.210)
PriceSens4 -9.928 -2.609 -26.281 -7.215 -44.029 -9.758
(28.181) (66.145) (27.967) (28.216) (70.896) (24.993)
PriceSens5 -23.441 -25.563 -32.436 -16.124 -64.295 -9.884
(28.448) (66.414) (28.386) (28.410) (71.441) (25.219)
Athens -4.480 5.315 -6.847 1.485 6.951 2.272
(6.906) (12.287) (8.323) (7.072) (12.996) (8.141)
Constant 71.128 156.537 71.715 -57.906 84.232 -78.357
(46.364) (95.490) (52.442) (47.743) (100.539) (50.703)
ln(σ) 5.105∗∗∗ 5.344∗∗∗ 4.902∗∗∗ 5.217∗∗∗ 5.516∗∗∗ 4.944∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.147) (0.106) (0.089) (0.161) (0.104)
N 6346 3416 2930 6346 3416 2930
AIC 7405.604 3863.316 3437.730 8312.091 4548.620 3678.024
BIC 7655.561 4090.356 3659.092 8562.047 4775.661 3899.386
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A4: Interval regression estimates with uncertainty corrections at different thresholds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No correction Cut off=6 Cut off=7 Cut off=8 Cut off=9
Consequentiality -10.435 -7.215 -4.415 -2.806 -7.061
(7.976) (8.406) (8.441) (8.445) (8.760)
Cheap talk 3.198 0.533 3.028 7.877 6.784
(8.008) (8.407) (8.450) (8.492) (8.723)
Cheap talk &
Consequentiality
-6.995 -8.202 -7.820 -2.169 -2.293
(7.980) (8.356) (8.405) (8.430) (8.758)
IVM -153.459∗∗∗ -132.709∗∗∗ -110.784∗∗∗ -63.284∗∗∗ 9.277∗
(12.278) (11.437) (9.923) (6.965) (5.283)
WTP 25.224∗∗∗ 26.210∗∗∗ 25.759∗∗∗ 22.584∗∗∗ 27.514∗∗∗
(6.002) (6.317) (6.332) (6.307) (6.653)
Order -34.028∗∗∗ -36.358∗∗∗ -36.804∗∗∗ -37.491∗∗∗ -43.588∗∗∗
(6.177) (6.570) (6.601) (6.653) (7.128)
Constant 197.542∗∗∗ 174.992∗∗∗ 151.317∗∗∗ 101.694∗∗∗ 28.970∗∗∗
(12.053) (11.322) (10.063) (8.188) (8.819)
ln(σ) 5.091∗∗∗ 5.169∗∗∗ 5.191∗∗∗ 5.221∗∗∗ 5.274∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.085)
N 7544 7544 7544 7544 7544
AIC 8998.514 9471.348 9747.724 10086.223 9985.281
BIC 9053.943 9526.776 9803.152 10141.651 10040.709
Clustered standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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